







                                                                                  
Abstract: 
The movement of goods and services across borders has gradually been liberalized over the past few 
decades, thanks in large part to multilateral legal frameworks negotiated in global fora such as the World 
Trade Organization. In contrast, the movement of people across borders remains severely restricted 
worldwide. To date, there is no multilateral framework, nor is there an international negotiating forum 
tasked to regulate global migration flows, despite ever increasing numbers of international migrants and a 
keener understanding of the contribution that migration and remittances can make to the prospects of 
developing countries.  
This paper will examine the patchwork of multilateral, regional and bilateral legal instruments through 
which migrants from Asia and the Pacific currently legally cross borders in search of employment. It 
concludes that the existing frameworks are very inadequate: in almost all the multilateral and preferential 
agreements focusing predominantly on trade (GATS Mode 4 and Preferential Trade Agreements), 
countries have made binding commitments only with respect to the temporary entry of high-skilled service 
providers.  
Given the regulatory vacuum at multilateral and regional levels, countries in Asia and the Pacific have 
entered into dozens of bilateral agreements in the area of labour and migration. While these agreements do 
typically cover semi- and unskilled labour migrants, they rarely provide binding market access 
commitments or enforceable protections for migrants. As a result, most semi- and unskilled labour 
migrants today still cross borders through unilateral guest and seasonal worker schemes which provide the 
migrant-sending country with no leverage and the migrant with little protection. In conclusion, there is 
significant scope for further cooperation among nations in the area of labour migration, which could result 
in greater global welfare gains and distributive justice.  
Keywords: International Migration, Trade in Services, GATS Mode 4, Preferential Trade Agreements, 
Bilateral Labour Agreements.  
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I.   Legal migration for employment: the missing part of globalization? 
 
Globalization is commonly understood to refer to the increased movement of goods and services, capital 
and people across international borders. Increased international flows in all four categories are often inter-
related, yet they are largely perceived and treated as separate by policy-makers, resulting in very different 
legal frameworks for each of them. Indeed, over the past few decades, policy-makers have made great 
strides in liberalizing first the movement of goods and later that of services. However, to date, the one 
significant exception to the general trend of freer markets is legal international migration for employment.  
 
The many legal obstacles to migration that we take for granted today are actually a relatively new 
phenomenon. Throughout the colonial period, it was first and foremost the trade in goods that was 
impeded by high tariffs, whereas few restrictions applied to capital mobility, services (which were largely 
considered nontradable and thus were not regulated) and the movement of natural persons across borders. 
These liberal immigration policies can be explained first by the fact that immigration was in many cases 
viewed as a desirable remedy for labour shortages in particular in new colonies, and second, that social 
welfare systems were not yet well developed and thus the cost of absorbing new immigrant arrivals was 
limited.  
 
From the Second World War onwards, most developed countries inversed their policies: they liberalized 
their trade in goods and services but adopted increasingly restrictive migration policies. Cheaper 
communication technologies and air travel meant that larger numbers of people could gain information on 
and access to foreign countries in search of employment opportunities. At the same time, concerns about 
high unemployment rates in many countries and the rise of the social welfare state created a wariness of 
migrants who are often willing to work for less pay and may be costly in terms of social benefits such as 
schooling and health care. As a result, in the first decade of the 21
st century, international migration for 
employment is still strictly controlled by almost all of the world’s countries.
2 
 
Based on the theory of comparative advantage, classical economists have argued for decades that where 
productive factors (capital and labour) are allowed to flow freely across borders to where they are most 
productive, global welfare is maximized because of the optimal allocation of resources. Policy-makers 
were gradually convinced by this argument in connection with trade in goods, resulting in the adoption of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, followed by the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) in 1995. The course of recent economic history seems to confirm the earlier 
prediction of global welfare gains, with export-led growth contributing to rising standards of living in 
many developing countries in the world.  
 
Such a paradigm shift has yet to occur in the area of migration. Many economists have made arguments 
calling for freer migration policies similar to those in favor of the free movement of goods. Some 
researchers have even argued that the potential gains from more open labour migration may dwarf those 
from freer trade. One model predicts that a relatively small increase in world migration would generate 
US$52 billion more in world income than the removal of all remaining restrictions on trade in goods.
3 
Similarly, the World Bank estimated in 2006 that if developed countries permitted labour migration to 




2 Gordon (2010), p. 1121. 
3 Walmsley and Winters (2005), p. 690. 




Economic modeling of this type has led many to believe that the public discourse focusing on official 
development assistance and preferential or duty-free, quota-free tariff schemes for least developed 
countries is misguided. It is now increasingly being recognized that liberalizing migration, in particular for 
semi-skilled or unskilled labour, could be the single most effective global development policy to reach 
poverty-reduction goals in low-income countries.
5 
 
It may then appear surprising that as will be examined in this paper, there is at present no comprehensive 
global regime for migration, nor is there a global negotiating forum for migration-related policies, as is the 
case for trade in goods and services with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indeed, the role of 
organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) is to advocate for fairer rules for migrants and workers, rather than to serve as a 
negotiating forum. 
 
In order to set the topic of migration in its proper context, this paper will first provide a snapshot of the 
migration patterns and their economic impact in Asia and the Pacific (Part II). It will then briefly examine 
the various legal frameworks that currently exist for legal migration for employment in the Asia-Pacific 
region, namely the partial multilateral framework for the temporary provision of services which exists 
under the GATS (Part III), regional and bilateral frameworks under preferential trade agreements (or 
PTAs) (Part IV), and labour agreements entered into on a bilateral basis (Part V).
6  
 
II. Labour migration patterns in Asia and the Pacific  
 
1.  South-South migration is on the rise 
 
At the start of the 21
st century, one in every 35 people is an international migrant, a number of people 
equivalent to the population of the fifth most populous country in the world, Brazil.
7 The number of 
international migrants has doubled over the past 25 years, suggesting that the lower cost of transportation 
and communication makes international migration an increasingly accessible and attractive option.
8 
Migration is furthermore of particular relevance for Asia: as home to half the world’s population, 
developing Asia is the source of a large portion of the world’s migrants.
9  
 
Of the total migrant population of around 200 million individuals, about half are thought to be migrants 
primarily seeking employment, while the remainder is believed to migrate in order to study or reunite with 
family, or are refugees or asylum-seekers.
10 Some of these migrants cross borders only temporarily, while 
others stay in their country of adoption for many years. Also, it is important for policymakers to be aware 
that more and more women are seeking work opportunities abroad and often become the primary 
breadwinners for the families they leave behind: today, 48.6% of all migrants are women.
11 
 
It is often mistakenly assumed that most migrants, both legal and illegal, originate from least developed 
countries and head to developed countries, however distant. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 1, of the ten 
largest migrant-sending countries in the Asia-Pacific region, only two are least developed countries 
                                                            
5 The World Bank (2006), pp. 25-26; Stiglitz (2006), p. 9, WTO (2009), paras. 48-49.  
6 This paper will not cover the significant area of illegal migration, which is a research topic in itself. 
7 Global Commission on International Migration (2005), p. 83. 
8 Commission on International Migration (2005), pp. 5, 11-12. 
9 Asian Development Bank (2008), p. 77. 
10 Global Commission on International Migration (2005), pp. 1, 84. 




(Afghanistan and Bangladesh). In terms of destination countries, while it is true that worldwide, the top 
destination countries in order of migrant arrivals are higher-income countries - the United States, the 
Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Canada
12 - statistics also reveal that half of all 
international migrants from developing countries settle in other developing countries in their same region 
(a phenomenon known as South-South migration).
13  Indeed, geographical proximity is thought to be one 
of the three primary factors driving international migration, together with income differences across 
countries and networks.
14  
                                                                   
Figure 1:  Top migrant countries of origin in 
























Source: The World Bank (2011), p. 3. 
Note:  These numbers include both legal and illegal migrants. 
Figure 2:  Top migrant destination countries in 























Source: The World Bank (2011), p. 1. 
Note:  These numbers include both legal and illegal migrants. 
 
Another commonly held misconception is that countries are either primarily migrant-receiving or migrant-
sending countries. In fact, many countries simultaneously send and receive migrants, as the comparison of 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrates. Countries such as India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation are both top 
migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries. For example, India receives a large number of migrants 
from Bangladesh and Nepal but also sends a large number of migrants to Gulf Countries and to North 
America.  
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) conducted a 
detailed analysis of the origin and destination of migrants for the five sub-regions of ESCAP, as replicated 
in Table 1 below. The data shows that in the case of two sub-regions, North and Central Asia, and the 
Pacific (Oceania), the preferred destination of migrants by far is within their sub-region of origin (e.g. 
migration from Central Asian countries to Russia or from Pacific Islands to Australia and New Zealand).  
 
For the remaining three sub-regions, the main destination of migrants is a different region: for South and 
South-West Asia it is the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Sri Lankans who migrate to Gulf Countries), 
and for South-East, East and North-East Asia it is North America (e.g. Chinese migrating to Canada). 
However, in each of these three sub-regions, the number of intra-subregion migrants is only slightly 







12 The World Bank (2011), p. 1. 
13 The World Bank (2011), p. 12.  




Table 1. Bilateral migrant stocks, by Asia-Pacific sub-regions and selected regions in the world, 
2010 (in millions)  
 
Source: ESCAP (2011), Table 3.3, p. 142.  
Note: EU15 = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
 
 
Finally, when reviewing the patterns of migration originating from countries in Asia and the Pacific, it is 
interesting to note that contrary to the widely held belief that developing countries of the region export 
only unskilled workers, in reality most developing countries also export many skilled workers. For 
example in the case of the Philippines, migrants in the 1970s were mainly low-skilled construction 
workers, whereas today they also represent a significant number of higher skilled service workers in 
hospitals and commercial centers: in 2010, 13.7% of Filipino emigrants was tertiary educated. The 
comparable number is even higher for countries such as Afghanistan (23.3%) and Sri Lanka (29.7%), 
which probably reflects the fact that tertiary educated individuals from such countries have more 




2.  Labour migration has significant economic impacts through remittances  
 
International labour migration has extensive economic, social and cultural impacts in both countries of 
origin and destination. Advocates of labour migration often associate international migration with a wide 
range of benefits such as easing labour shortages, facilitating knowledge exchanges, building business 
networks, and creating political ties.  
 
While the above mentioned benefits can be hard to measure and thus remain controversial, there is one 
more readily quantifiable economic impact of international migration: the impact of remittances – the 
money sent home by migrants. As shown in Figure 3 replicated from the World Bank, remittance flows 
have tripled over the past decade and are now more than twice the level of official development assistance 
(ODA) to developing countries, and almost as high as foreign direct investment (FDI). For many 
developing countries, such remittances constitute a large source of foreign exchange earnings, sometimes 
even exceeding export revenues, aid, or other private capital flows.  
 
                                                            




Figure 3: Comparison of Remittances, Official Development Aid and Private Capital Flows from 
World Bank (2010) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank (2010), p. 2. 
 
 
The Asia-Pacific region receives the largest portion – about 42% – of the world’s remittances. The five 




Furthermore, the impact of remittances as a percentage of a country’s GDP is very significant, particularly 
in smaller economies of the Asia-Pacific region. As illustrated in Figure 4, remittances represent a 
significantly higher portion of the GDP than aid in many developing economies of the region, and in the 
case of countries such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Samoa and Tonga, surpass other important source of 
revenues such as merchandise exports.  
 
                                                            




Figure 4: Remittances, Official Development Assistance and Merchandise Exports as a share of 


































a % of GDP
 Remittances
as a % of GDP
South-East Asia South Asia Central Asia Pacific Islands  
Source: World Development Indicators Database for remittances, ODA and GDP, available at http://data.worldbank.org; ESCAP Statistical 
Yearbook 2009 for merchandise exports, available at www.unescap.org.  
 
Another interesting characteristic of remittances is that they are a relatively reliable source of income in 
times of economic crisis (though they may also have an inflationary effect on the receiving country 
economies). Several studies have shown that remittance flows stay relatively stable despite economic 
turmoil for a number of reasons: more people may migrate overall in response to job losses in their 
country of origin, increasing the total amount of remittances; migrants abroad may send more money 
home to compensate for tougher economic times in their country of origin; and those migrants who lose 
their jobs abroad may return to their country of origin, bringing their savings with them.
17  
 
Finally, while the question of the poverty-reduction impact of remittances is still debated in the literature, 
several studies do suggest that remittances can have a significant poverty reduction effect, possibly greater 
than official development assistance. For example, one comprehensive study of 74 developing countries 
conducted by World Bank researchers found that a 10 percent increase in the share of international 





3.  Why is there no multilateral negotiating body or treaty relating to access to labour markets for 
migrants? 
 
As mentioned above, the number of international migrants is large and growing and the economic impact 
of remittances is significant. Much time has been spent by governments, international organizations and 
non-governmental organizations on finding ways to reduce global poverty and inequality, and yet the past 
decades focused on aid and preferential market access for exports from developing countries have yielded 
only limited results.  
                                                            
17 The World Bank (2011), page 17. 





Against this backdrop, one would expect that a comprehensive legal framework would be in place to 
regulate labour migration or at the very least that a global forum would exist in which such issues could be 
raised at the multilateral level. However, to date, neither practical considerations nor economic efficiency 
arguments have swayed the world’s policy-makers. Instead, migration policies continue to be firmly 
rooted in considerations of history, demography (population pressures), politics (considerations of state 
sovereignty) and sociology (assimilative and cultural concerns). Migration is also routinely considered 
undesirable both in receiving countries – a drain on public services – and in sending countries – migration 
as brain drain.   
 
As a result, to this day, there is no international migration regime or multilateral negotiation forum for 
issues relating to migration. Instead, as will be examined in the next sections of this paper, the access for 
legal labour migrants to their countries of destination is at present regulated through a patchwork of 
various multilateral, regional and bilateral legal frameworks. The next section, Part III, will examine the 
partial multilateral legal framework provided by GATS Mode 4. Part IV will then examine the relevant 
provisions of some of the preferential trade agreements entered into by countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region, and Part V will review some of the applicable bilateral labour agreements.  
 
III. The multilateral framework: temporary movement of service providers under GATS Mode 4 
 
At the multilateral level, frameworks for managing cross-border movements of people are few and remain 
highly fragmented.
19 In fact, such movements are the focus of only two multilateral treaties: the first is the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (1990), which seeks to create protections for migrants but does not provide enhanced access to 




The second relevant multilateral treaty is the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
which includes provisions relating to the temporary movement of natural persons as service providers, 
also known as GATS Mode 4.
21 The scope of GATS Mode 4 is limited to the cross-border movement of 
service providers (as opposed to individuals seeking access to a WTO member’s employment market), 
and on a temporary basis (although the GATS effectively defines temporary as any “non-permanent” 
cross-border movement, WTO members usually construe the term to mean a period of between three 
months and five years). In fact, the GATS explicitly states that it shall not apply to measures affecting 
“natural persons seeking access to the employment market” of a party to the agreement, nor to “measures 
regarding […] residence or employment on a permanent basis.”
22  
 
Furthermore, WTO members limit the applicability of the GATS provisions through their individual 
binding commitments under the agreement. An analysis of the horizontal commitments under GATS 
Mode 4 (not taking into account sector-specific variations) reveals that only few horizontal commitments 
                                                            
19 Panizzon (2010), p. 5, see also Betts (2008), p.2.  
20 The list of parties to the treaty can be viewed at http://treaties.un.org. 
21 Developing countries originally negotiated the inclusion of Mode 4 as a GATS mode of supply for the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in order to balance developed country interests in supplying services 
through Mode 3 “commercial presence” (i.e. foreign investment in service sectors) and labour service 
providers (Mode 4).  




have been made at all under GATS Mode 4, fewer than in any of the other three modes of services 
supply.
23 Paradoxically, the more important the temporary provision of services is for a particular services 
sector (e.g. professional and health services), the fewer the commitments made by WTO members under 
the GATS.  
 
Finally, while the wording of GATS Mode 4 provisions does not restrict its applicability to any particular 
profession or skill level, in practice, the commitments made by WTO members relate almost exclusively 
to movements of professionals and skilled workers linked to business and investment.
24 To date, 
commitments are worded narrowly so as to exclude any semi-skilled or unskilled workers.
25 As is also the 
case for Modes 1 and 3, Mode 4 commitments are also often subject to other restrictions such as economic 
needs tests or licensing requirements.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the limited market access provided by GATS Mode 4 by outlining the commitments of 
some of the top destination countries for service providers from Asia-Pacific countries. The table shows 
that the commitments of primarily migration destination countries such as the Australia, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and the United States restrict their commitments under GATS Mode 4 to 
intra-corporate transferees (i.e. employees of foreign companies who have a presence in the host country), 
business visitors (i.e. individuals who visit a country to attend trade fairs or negotiate contracts), and, in a 
few cases, contractual service suppliers (i.e. employees of a foreign company which does not have a 
presence in the host country).   
 
Interestingly, the commitments undertaken by developed and developing countries are equally shallow.
26 
Table 2 shows that countries such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand which are both 
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries do not make broader commitments under GATS Mode 4 
than countries that are predominantly migrant-receiving countries.   
 
                                                            
23 WTO (2009), para. 35. 
24 Commitments under GATS Mode 4 are often linked to those under GATS Mode 3 which relates to the establishment of a 
commercial presence, meaning that if a company decides to establish a presence in a member country, it may also bring 
executives to supply services related to their investment for a limited amount of time. 
25 WTO (2009), paras. 74-77; Marchetti (2004), p. 31. 




Table 2: Overview of GATS Mode 4 commitments of selected countries 
 
Source: See scheduled commitments by the listed countries in the WTO Trade in Services Database accessible at 
http://tsdb.wto.org/default.aspx. 
 
In light of the limited scope of GATS Mode 4 – limited to temporary service providers – and the high-
skills bias of commitments, the GATS currently has limited practical economic relevance for least 
developed countries (LDCs). LDCs have tried to include broader commitments under GATS Mode 4 as 
part of the Doha Development Round of WTO trade negotiations. They succeeded in obtaining the 
adoption of “Special Modalities of Negotiations on Services Trade Liberalization for LDCs” by the 
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 3 September 2003. These Special Modalities state 
that  
 
“it is recognized that the temporary movement of natural persons supplying services (Mode 4) provides 
potential benefits to the sending and recipient Members. LDCs have indicated that this is one of the most 
important means of supplying services internationally. Members shall, to the extent possible […] consider 




persons identified by LDCs in their request.”
27  
 
The general “development” character of the current round of negotiations notwithstanding, the “best 
efforts” nature of such statements and the actual offers submitted in the ongoing negotiations suggest that 
there is limited potential for improvement on Mode 4 commitments generally and next to none on semi- or 
unskilled service suppliers.  
 
Furthermore, when looking even beyond the current round of negotiations, it seems unlikely that countries 
will significantly deepen their GATS Mode 4 commitments to include semi- und unskilled service 
providers. The main reason is that while labour market conditions and migration needs fluctuate with 
world events, GATS commitments do not. Indeed, GATS commitments are binding and enforceable, so 
that commitments in the area of access for service providers would significantly restrict a country’s 
flexibility to respond quickly and unilaterally to labour market needs and immigration influxes. In 
addition, a WTO member seeking to modify or withdraw commitments must negotiate compensatory 
adjustment with potentially affected members if requested to do so.
28 
 
A second reason is that the GATS’ Most Favoured Nation principle (MFN), which requires concessions 
made by a WTO member to be extended to all WTO members equally on a non-discriminatory basis 
(including any compensatory adjustment as discussed above) renders the commitments taken under GATS 
blind to history, politics and culture. While this is a desirable feature from the point of view of economic 
efficiency, the area of immigration policy has long been an instrument for policymakers to favour certain 
countries with historical or cultural ties, such as ex-colonies, over other countries.  Although members 
may take MFN exemptions,
29 such exemptions are understood to be “one-off” and temporary (typically 
lasting no more than 10 years).
30 
 
The missed regulatory opportunities of GATS outlined above have led to a rise of other types of 
agreements to address migration issues which shall be examined in the following parts, in particular 
regional and bilateral trade agreements (Part IV) and bilateral labour agreements (Part V).  
 
IV.   The regional and bilateral trade framework: preferential trade agreements  
 
Considering the slow progress of the multilateral trade negotiations over the past decade, the recent trend 
in many parts of the world, and in particular in the Asia-Pacific region, has been a move toward 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between two or more countries. Such agreements are quicker to 
negotiate and easier to amend than multilateral treaties. The enthusiasm of governments for these 
agreements is greeted with caution by researchers who contend that these agreements do not provide for 
significantly broader trade liberalization than what the WTO agreements had already achieved, while 





27 Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, 3 September 2003, Modalities for the special treatment for least-
developed country members in the negotiations on trade in services, at paragraph 9; available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr351_e.htm. 
28 GATS Article XXI: Modification of Schedules. 
29 GATS Article II: MFN Treatment. 
30 See Understanding the WTO – Services at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (explaining 
how “in order to protect the general MFN principle, the exemptions could only be made once; nothing can be added to the lists . 
. . and will normally last no more than ten years”). 




In the area of regulating labour mobility, it could be argued that PTAs may in fact be a more appropriate 
instrument than multilateral treaties. As seen above, the GATS never aimed to comprehensively regulate 
labour migration. Furthermore, regional and bilateral trade agreements can be tailored to reflect regional 
migration patterns as well as the historical, cultural and political ties between countries. The 1994 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in fact was the first regional trade agreement to prove that 
such instruments can be efficient in regulating labor flows. What about PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region? 
Do they provide for broader market liberalization for temporary service providers, including in particular 
less skilled service providers?  
 
Of the 120 PTAs currently in force in the Asia-Pacific region, 41 cover trade in services to some degree 
and of those, 39 include within their scope the temporary movement of natural persons as service 
providers (see list in Annex I).
32 However, all of these PTAs follow the same approach to labour mobility 
as the GATS: they relate to the temporary movement of service providers rather than a broader range of 
individuals, and country commitments are biased towards high-skilled professionals.
33 They also usually 
use GATS-identical carve-outs, for example the exclusion of permanent migration and access to the labour 
market.  
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the concessions of countries under some selected PTAs, examining only 
the horizontal concessions which apply to the entire economy (disregarding sectoral variations). Overall, 
the review of the region’s PTAs reveals that none provide for full mobility of labour (full market access 
and full national treatment) as does for example the European Union. The broadest concessions are 
typically found in bilateral trade agreements between two high-income countries (e.g. Australia-New 
Zealand, Singapore-USA, Singapore-Japan), or, to a lesser extent, in Economic Partnership Agreements 
which usually cover a wider range of commitments beyond labour mobility.  
 
Larger regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have had only 
limited success in addressing labour mobility, despite an acknowledgement that migration and in 
particular irregular low-skilled migration is in fact very substantial among its members. The ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) was signed in 1995 and is being implemented in successive 
packages of commitments with a goal of moving towards “achieving free flow, with flexibility, of services 
by 2015.” In addition, ASEAN leaders resolved that an ASEAN “economic community” should be 
established by 2020 and adopted the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint in 2007 as the master plan 
towards achieving an ASEAN region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labour, 
and freer flow of capital.
34 Notwithstanding these resolutions, the large economic disparities between 
ASEAN members have impeded any groundbreaking progress in the area of labor mobility: the level of 
commitments by ASEAN members has followed the general pattern of GATS commitments and have 




32 Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database www. http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/, accessed on 11 April 
2011. 
33 The first draft of the GATS was in fact based on the provisions of NAFTA; subsequent PTAs relating to 
services are typically based on the GATS model.  
34 ASEAN Economic Community Factbook, ASEAN Secretariat (2011), pp. xii and 19-20. 





Table 3: Temporary provision of cross-border services in selected Preferential Trade Agreements 
of Asia and the Pacific 
 
Source: PTAs accessible through the Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database, available 




Generally, the PTAs entered into by countries in Asia and the Pacific typically do provide for some 
liberalization beyond their members’ GATS commitments (so-called “GATS Plus” or “GATS +” 
agreements), though such liberalization is usually quite modest. As described in the third column of Table 
3, such further liberalization is usually achieved through either:  
 
Granting longer stay authorizations for the categories of persons already covered by the GATS; and/or  
 
Broadening the range of professional categories benefiting from temporary entry privileges (for example, 
the economic partnership agreements entered into by Japan broaden Japan’s commitments to service 
providers such as nurses and “specialists in humanities,” whereas its GATS mode 4 commitments include 
only legal, accounting and tax specialists as noted in Table 2). 
 
It should also be kept in mind that in most cases, the right to labour mobility remains subject to national 
regulations relating for example to licensing, recognition of qualifications and immigration. Indeed, the 
majority of agreements do not over-ride general migration legislation and countries thus retain broad 
discretion to grant, refuse and administer residence permits and visas.
36 Only in two studied cases, those of 
the Singapore-USA Free Trade Agreement and the Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement, do the 
agreements create a new category of visa to expand the immigration rules to provide greater market 
access.  
 
The above overview of the region’s PTAs leads to the conclusion that while PTAs have achieved some 
liberalization beyond the GATS, they have had only limited impacts on labour mobility overall, and no 





36 OECD (2002), p. 5. 




V.   The bilateral labour framework: memoranda of understanding and labour agreements  
 
As seen above, the currently existing rules negotiated in connection with trade agreements at the 
multilateral, regional and bilateral levels address international labour mobility only very partially, mainly 
as it relates to high-skilled professionals. Against this backdrop, countries usually rely on other 
mechanisms to manage their migration flows, in particular:  
 
  Unilateral temporary migration schemes, which exist at either the skilled migration level (such as 
the U.S. H-1B visa and the temporary skilled migration programs of Australia and Canada), or the 
semi- or unskilled level (such as seasonal work programs in agriculture, tourism and construction 
that are open to all applicants who qualify, regardless of their nationality);
38 and/or  
 
  Memoranda of understanding or bilateral labor agreements negotiated between two countries.  
 
While unilateral labour migration programmes such as the European guest worker schemes have existed 
for many decades, the last twenty years have seen a proliferation of bilateral agreements in the field of 
migration. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for example notes that 
more than 176 bilateral agreements and other forms of labour recruitment schemes are currently in force 
in its 34 member countries.
39  
 
In Asia and the Pacific, dozens of agreements have been concluded, though it is nearly impossible to draw 
a complete inventory of existing agreements due to the lack of public availability of many of them. The 
extent of commitments varies considerably among the various agreements. At the highest level of 
commitment are binding agreements between two countries in which the receiving country commits to 
accepting a predetermined number of – typically less skilled – workers to specific segments of the labour 
market, and/or (2) to guarantee the welfare of workers while they are living in the host country. Such 
labour agreements often also feature a commitment on the part of both countries to encourage the return of 
workers once their temporary stay permit expires, to help receiving countries manage illegal permit 
overstays, but also to help sending countries to recapture skills learned abroad and savings accumulated. 
Examples of such binding bilateral agreements include the agreement between the Philippines and the 
United Kingdom (Department of Health) for the recruitment of healthcare professionals and the 
Employment Permit System of the Republic of Korea (see Table 4).   
 
Most bilateral labour agreements entered into by countries in Asia and the Pacific are of a much more 
limited level of commitment and usually take the form of a non-binding memorandum of understanding.
40 
These agreements typically do not provide any market access commitments, and most of them lack 
enforcement mechanisms for the guarantees of protection offered. As illustrated in Table 4, bilateral 
labour agreements typically focus on one or several of the below areas:  
 
  Labour recruitment (the recruitment process is set as either running through private manpower 




38 The World Bank (2006), p. 72. 
39 Bobeva and Garson (2004), p. 12. Such labour agreements include seasonal worker agreements, guest worker agreements, 
trainee agreements and sector-based schemes to address shortages in particular sectors. 




  Workers’ welfare and protection agreements (e.g. Sri Lanka and several Middle Eastern countries); 
and/or 
 
  Social security agreements relating to the reciprocity and exportability of benefits (e.g. Philippines 




Table 4: Selected bilateral labour agreements in Asia and the Pacific 
 
Sources: Government websites (Philippines: www.poea.gov.ph/lmi_kiosk/labor_agreements.htm; Japan: www.mofa.go.jp; Republic of Korea: 
www.eps.go.kr/en/view/view_01.jsp); also see Go (2007); OECD (2004) 
  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that while many bilateral trade agreements have been adopted in Asia and the 
Pacific, the depth of the agreements remains shallow. One specificity of Asian bilateral labour agreements 
seems to be that with the exception of the Korean Employment Permit System and the Japanese trainee 
system, Asia’s migration infrastructure is largely in the hands of private recruitment agencies,
41 whereas 
in other regions, the public administration (national or local labour offices) tends to control the process.
42  
 
The migrant-sending country with the most bilateral agreements is the Philippines, which entered into 13 
agreements, 12 with labour-receiving countries and one with a labor-sending country, Indonesia. 
Paradoxically, the Philippines has not succeeded in entering into bilateral agreements with many of the 
principal destination countries for overseas Filipino workers such as Singapore, Japan and Saudi Arabia.
43 
Indeed, a general observation is that the more immigrants a country receives, the less it is willing to enter 
into any type of formal labour agreements (e.g. United States, Saudi Arabia).
44 
 
Several labour-sending countries have sought to redress the imbalance of bargaining power between 
sending and receiving countries through enhanced regional cooperation. These regional processes include 
the Colombo Process on “the management of overseas employment and contractual labor for countries of 
origin in Asia,”
45 another is the ASEAN-led Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers (2007), which commits migrant-receiving states to draw up charters that ensure decent 
working conditions, protection from abuse and a minimum wage for migrant workers. Similarly, the 
Philippines took the initiative to bring together several sending countries in Asia to coordinate their 
policies on bilateral agreements and to work together with receiving country governments. The 
Philippines also entered into a formal agreement with a sending country, Indonesia, in an attempt to 
promote workers’ rights and provide them with legal guarantees.  
 
While these regional initiatives are important to draw attention to labour migration issues, the goals 
pursued remain relatively modest. Even if fully successful, these processes will not result in actual legal 
frameworks which would help to regulate migration flows and provide broader market access in particular 
to lower-skilled labor. 
 
VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
This brief overview of existing legal frameworks for labour migration suggests that one of the reasons 
why market liberalization has yet to occur in the area of migration is that migration has much broader 
implications for society than does merchandise trade. Contrary to the area of trade in goods, policy-makers 
must consider both the behavior and welfare of people who cross borders, and how these will affect 
domestic residents. As a result, labour migration does not fit naturally as part of trade negotiations and 
perhaps for that reason has seen only limited liberalization in that area.   
 
With respect to legal frameworks, this brief overview of existing regimes suggests that migrant labour is 
nowhere dealt with satisfactorily: not as part of trade negotiations, and not as part of labour negotiations; 
neither at multilateral, regional or bilateral levels. Policy-makers have achieved some limited 
liberalization of skilled labour migration in the multilateral negotiations (GATS Mode 4) and under some 
preferential trade agreements, but hardly any for the movement of unskilled workers. This conclusion 
suggests that the political resistance to liberalizing labour hardly decreases at bilateral or regional levels.  
                                                            
41 Martin (2008), p. 6 
42 Bobeva and Garson (2004), p. 18. 
43 Go (2004), p. 192. 
44 Gordon (2010), p. 1125; Go (2004), p. 188 and 192. 
45 See http://www.colomboprocess.org/ 





Many researchers argue that the key underlying problem in the area of migration is the lack of a 
satisfactory quid pro quo between sending and receiving countries. Some researchers suggest that 
destination countries have little incentive to enter into binding agreements on migration due to the fact that 
unlike in the area of trade in goods, the benefits from labor migration are available to them through 
unilateral action.
46 Others underline that multilateral, nondiscriminatory approaches are less relevant for 
migration than for trade in goods because the economic implications of nondiscrimination are different. In 
trade, nondiscrimination maximizes economic efficiency by allowing the lowest-cost supplier to compete, 
thus reducing prices. But labor markets in high-income countries are generally not permitted to adjust 
fully to the lowest-cost supplier (through minimum-wage laws and social-insurance schemes), thus the 
benefits of nondiscrimination are weaker in migration than in trade.
47  
 
These economic arguments suggest that the best hope for a regulatory framework for migration, including 
unskilled migration, is that negotiations on migration be coupled to other areas so that a meaningful quid 
pro quo can be established. While the Doha Development Round is often criticized as being too large of a 
package to be concluded as a single undertaking, its multi-faceted approach does enable countries to make 
trade-offs among a broader set of issues, from agriculture over services to intellectual property protection, 
which increases the likelihood that a mutually beneficial agreement may be reached among nations.  
 
Finally, this paper concludes that given the magnitude of labour migration flows and the power 
imbalances between migrant-sending and receiving countries, a stronger regulatory framework continues 
to be highly desirable. Such a framework could serve both to address labour shortages in migrant-
receiving countries and to better control irregular migration flows, as well as serve migrant-sending 
countries by providing a valve for high national unemployment and an opportunity to increase earnings. 
Ultimately, better regulation of international migration could result in global welfare gains and contribute 
significantly to distributive justice between high-income and lower-income countries. 
 
                                                            
46 Gordon (2010), p. 1111. 
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Annex 1: Preferential Trade Agreements of the Asia-Pacific region which cover trade in services  
√
√










√ United States - Viet Nam Trade Relations Agreement 2001
√ 2004 United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement 40
√ 2005 United States - Lao PDR Trade Relations Agreement 39
√
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (Brunei, Singapore, New 
Zealand and Chile)
2006
√ 2009 Singapore - Peru FTA 37
√ Singapore - Jordan FTA 2005
√ Singapore - Australia FTA 2003
South Asian FTA (SAFTA) (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka)
2006
√ New Zealand - Singapore Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 2001
√ New Zealand-China FTA 2008
Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 2008
2006 29 Republic of Korea - Singapore FTA
√ 28 Republic of Korea - Chile FTA 2004
√ 27 Japan - Viet Nam Economic Partnership Agreement 2009
√ 2007 26 Japan - Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement
√ 25 Japan-Switzerland Free Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement 2009
√ 24 Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement 2002
√ 23 Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement 2008
√ 22 Japan-Mexico Agreement for the Strengthening of Economic Partnership 2005
√ 21 Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement 2006
√ 20 Japan-Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement 2008
√ 19 Japan-Chile Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement 2007
√ 18 Japan - Brunei Economic Partnership Agreement 2008
√ 2005 17 India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
√ 2003 16 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) - Singapore FTA
√ 2006 15 European Free Trade Area (EFTA) - Republic of Korea FTA
√ 14 China-Singapore FTA 2009
√ 2009 13 China-Pakistan Agreement on Trade in Services
√ 2004 12 China-Macao Closer Economic Partnership Agreement
√ 11 China-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement 2004
 2006 10 China-Chile FTA
 2004 9
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand)
√ 8 Australia - United States Free Trade Agreement 2005
√ 2005 7 Australia-Thailand Free Trade Agreement
√ 6 Australia - Chile Free Trade Agreement  2009
√ 1993 5
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area and Framework 
Agreement of Services (AFAS)
√ 4 Australia - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)  1983
√ 3
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - Republic of Korea Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
2007
√ 2
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - China Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
2005
√ 2010 1
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - Australia - New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA)  (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar)
Provisions relating 





Name of Trade Agreement
 
Source: Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database, available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/, 
accessed on 11 April 2011. 